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Delegator Tiers (Stake + Proof-of-Contribution)

This is a proposed program-level incentive design: keep Livepeer protocol rewards permissionless and stake-proportional, but add bonus rewards and/or perks that require both:

  1. Bonded stake (alignment, anti-spam bond), and
  2. A verifiable proof of contribution (or usage) that is costly to sybil at scale.

The intent is to incentivize small and mid delegators without creating an easy “split stake across many wallets” farming strategy.

Summary (what this tries to do)​

  • Create a ladder of delegator “classes” by bonded LPT range.
  • Each class unlocks eligibility for extra rewards or privileges, but only if the wallet (or identity) produces “real work” for the ecosystem.
  • The “work” is measurable (usage, merged PRs, orchestrator adoption, revenue) and ideally represented by an on-chain attestation.

This is closer to a “builders / contributors program” than a protocol-level staking change.

Proposed tier ladder (refined)​

The original idea maps increasing stake → increasing scope of contribution. A refined version should:

  • avoid purely subjective criteria (“useful feedback”) without objective scoring
  • use definitions that can be audited and re-run
  • prefer on-chain or cryptographically attestable proofs

Suggested ladder (illustrative; numbers/thresholds should be tuned):

Tier 0 — 1–10 LPT (new users)​

  • Proof: paid Livepeer usage (e.g., ≥$X in fees or ≥Y minutes/jobs) over a window.
  • Reward/perk: small LPT rebate/credit, “new delegator” badge, onboarding support.

Tier 1 — 10–100 LPT (feedback + reliability)​

  • Proof: accepted issues with reproducible steps + confirmations (e.g., N “triaged/accepted” GitHub issues), or participation in structured bug bashes.
  • Reward/perk: early access / credits; not necessarily “more APR”.

Tier 2 — 100–1,000 LPT (code contributions)​

  • Proof: merged PR(s) to core repos, with a minimum review threshold and post-merge maintenance window.
  • Reward/perk: larger credits/rebates; public recognition; access to higher-rate API plans.

Tier 3 — 1,000–10,000 LPT (ecosystem tooling adopted by orchestrators)​

  • Proof: an open-source tool used by ≥10 distinct orchestrators, proven via signed attestations or verifiable integrations.
  • Reward/perk: higher credits, distribution support, co-marketing.

Tier 4 — 10,000–100,000 LPT (revenue + capacity)​

  • Proof: measurable net-new protocol revenue or usage attributable to the contributor (ideally on-chain) + a concrete capacity pledge (e.g., GPU uptime commitments).
  • Reward/perk: strategic partnership perks; capacity credits; potentially bespoke incentives.

Tier 5 — 100,000–1,000,000 LPT (rare “whale builder” tier)​

  • Proof: truly large, measurable net-new value delivered (e.g., $10M+ attributable usage), audited.
  • Reward/perk: bespoke; treat as BD/partnership rather than “delegator incentives”.

Key refinement: the higher tiers become partnership/BD programs; they should not be framed as “delegator APR”.

Sybil posture (why this is better than per-address APR boosts)​

The core problem with “small holder APR boosts” is that they are sybilable by stake-splitting.

This tier model avoids that only if:

  • the “proof” requirements are hard to replicate cheaply across many wallets, or
  • eligibility is tied to a uniqueness primitive (identity attestation) rather than wallet addresses

Practical options:

  • No-identity approach (sybil-costly): require proofs that impose real external cost (paid usage, real adoption, real revenue).
  • Identity approach (per-person): optional identity attestation for lower tiers (Gitcoin Passport / World ID / equivalent), then cap boosted rewards to the first cap LPT per identity.

There is no “0 friction, perfect uniqueness” system. The design should explicitly choose the tradeoff.

Implementation sketch (no core protocol change)​

  1. Define a scorecard that maps proofs → tiers (public rules).
  2. Issue proofs as on-chain attestations (e.g., EAS on Arbitrum) signed by:
    • maintainers (merged PRs / issues)
    • orchestrators (tool adoption)
    • a grants committee (revenue attribution claims, if needed)
  3. Distribute bonus rewards via Merkle drops (monthly/weekly) to:
    • wallets that are bonded ≥N rounds (retention)
    • and hold valid tier attestations in the measurement window

This can be run by a single entity (foundation/company) without governance changes, but it adds trust assumptions.

Expected impact (KPIs)​

Must be defined up front:

  • new first-time bonders (count) and retained-first-time-bonders (30/90/180d)
  • net-new stake bonded (net of unbond/withdraw)

  • of proofs issued per tier (and cost per proof)

  • decentralization impact (stake concentration among participating orchestrators)

Risks / failure modes​

  • Subjectivity / capture: if proofs are discretionary, incentives can be perceived as favoritism.
  • Gaming: low-quality PR spam; fake “adoption” with friendly orchestrators; wash-usage if “paid usage” is cheaply recyclable.
  • Complexity: too many rules can reduce participation versus simple LST/UX improvements.
  • Legal/PR: if framed as “profit share for token holders” it increases regulatory risk; frame as utility/credits + contributor program.

Bottom line​

This can be a useful adjacent solution (especially to create non-financial utility for holding/delegating LPT), but it should not replace the core, proven levers for small participant growth:

  • liquid staking + liquidity + integrations
  • retention-gated incentives
  • better onboarding UX