General Directions (What to Do Next)
This section is intentionally “directional”: it’s meant to help stakeholders align on what kinds of interventions are likely to move the important brackets (1k–10k, 10k+) and how to measure progress.
Direction 1 — Increase LPT utility (so larger participants can enter/exit sanely)
Why: the data implies that security-relevant growth is bracket growth, and big actors need deep liquidity + usable rails.
What it could include:
- A conservative liquid staking path (
stLPT / wstLPT), with integrations (borrowing, LP, vaults). - Targeted DEX liquidity improvements with explicit KPIs and stop conditions (see IDOL/Arrakis dossier).
How to measure:
- Growth in
1k–10kand10k+wallet counts and bonded LPT - Delegate/orchestrator concentration (top-10 share, Nakamoto 33/50)
Direction 2 — Make incentives retention-gated (not “pay per address”)
Why: paying “small balances per address” is sybilable; retention gating is harder to game and aligns with long-term stake.
What it could include:
- Treasury bonuses that vest over 90–180 days and are forfeited on early unbond/withdraw.
- “Re-delegate and stay” campaigns (time-boxed) targeting the
1k–10kbracket.
How to measure:
- 30/90/180d retention of new entrants in
1k–10kand10k+ - Net bonded stake change (not just churn)
Direction 3 — Treat “small delegators” as a UX/onboarding problem, not a security lever
Why: small wallets are important for community participation, but they don’t move bonded stake unless you also solve UX and liquidity.
What it could include:
- Gas sponsorship + “one-click delegation” funnels (Lisar-like), but with explicit stake/retention KPIs.
- Programs that nudge users to graduate from “single-digit LPT” toward meaningful stake bands over time.
How to measure:
- Funnel metrics: funded → bonded → still bonded at 90d
- Graduation: share of cohort that crosses
100,1k,10kthresholds
Direction 4 — Increase independent high-stake delegates (competition + decentralization)
Why: decentralization is primarily a function of stake distribution across delegates, not just delegator accounts.
What it could include:
- Programs that help new/independent orchestrators reach meaningful stake (without concentrating to a single incumbent).
- Transparent “delegate quality” dashboards so larger delegators can allocate rationally.
How to measure:
-
of delegates ≥
100kand ≥1mbonded stake - Nakamoto coefficients over time (33% / 50%)
Direction 5 — Reduce inflation extractability (so yield doesn’t become structural sell pressure)
Why: if large actors can run delta-neutral staking, inflation rewards can get routinely withdrawn and routed off-chain, creating reflexive price pressure.
What it could include:
- Protocol-level: separate principal vs rewards and make the reward component time-gated (vesting) and/or penalized on early exit (avoid flat “principal exit taxes”).
- Program-level (if protocol change is too heavy): bonuses in an escrow contract with vest/forfeit; this helps program incentives but does not fix base-inflation extractability by itself.
How to measure:
- Reward-only exits over time (requires principal-vs-reward separation in staking accounting)
- Bridge-out → exchange routing changes (see
/research/l1-bridge-recipient-second-hop) - Retention curves for
1k–10kand10k+cohorts